Application of the Fairness Doctrine to Ordinary Product Advertisements: National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC by Sinak, David L
Boston College Law Review
Volume 20
Issue 2 Number 2 Article 4
1-1-1979
Application of the Fairness Doctrine to Ordinary
Product Advertisements: National Citizens
Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC
David L. Sinak
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Communications Law Commons
This Casenotes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
David L. Sinak, Application of the Fairness Doctrine to Ordinary Product Advertisements: National
Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC, 20 B.C.L. Rev. 425 (1979),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol20/iss2/4
Application of the Fairness Doctrine to Ordinary Product Advertisements: Na-
tional Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC'---The fairness doctrine in
broadcasting imposes a twofold obligation on television and radio broadcast
licensees: licensees must broadcast material concerning controversial issues of
public importance, and they must broadcast differing views on those contro-
versial issues. 2
 The doctrine attempts to ensure that a licensee's total pro-
gramming presents balanced coverage of important public issues. 3
The fairness doctrine was developed by the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC or Commission),`' and was later incorporated into the
Communications Act' and validated by the Supreme Court!' While the FCC
considered applying the fairness doctrine to commercial advertising for over
thirty years,' it did not do so until 1967. In WCBS/TV (BanzhaD, 8 the First case
1
 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S, 926 (1978).
2
 The Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1248-49 (1949)
(hereinafter cited as Editorializing Report].
Id. at 1255. Potential sanctions for violating the doctrine run from a mild notice
of violation kept on file, see. Central Maine Broadcasting Sys., 23 F.C.C.2d 45 (1970), to
non-renewal of the offending broadcaster's license, see Brandywine-Main Line Radio,
Inc., 24 F.C.C.2d 18 (1970).
To comply with its fairness doctrine obligation, a licensee need not air opposing
views on the same program, but it must make a reasonable effort to ensure balanced
coverage. Editorializing Report, supra note 2, at 1255. For example, after broadcasting a
controversial issue, the licensee must make a diligent, good faith effort to solicit a
spokesman to present the opposing view. The. Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness
Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1. 13-14
37 (1974) thereinafter cited as Fairness Report]; Editorializing Report, supra note 2, at
1251. The licensee must also provide the spokesman airtime at its own expense if
sponsorship is unavailable. Cullman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 576, 577 (1963).
4
 Early traces of the fairness doctrine can be found in Great Lakes Broadcasting
Co., 3 F.R.C. ANN. REP. 32 (1929), rev'd on other grounds, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 281 U.S. 706 (1930); Trinity Methodist Church v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 62
F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933): Young People's Ass'n for
the Propagation of the Gospel, 6 F.C.C. 178 (1938); and, Mayflower Broadcasting
Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333 (1940). The FCC definitively formulated the doctrine in 1949.
Editorializing Report, supra note 2, at 1249-52.
47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976).
" Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 385 (1969).
Sam Morris, 11 F.C.C. 197 (1946), which was decided prior to the explicit for-
mulation of the fairness doctrine, was the first case to suggest advertising could involve
controversial public issues. Id. at 198-99. The case involved a radio station's refusal to
sell time for broadcast of alcohol abstinence commercials. Id. at 197. Although the FCC
refused to consider the problem in the context of a single station, id. at 198, it noted
that a licensee's public interest obligations might require the broadcast of viewpoints
opposing advertising claims when an advertisement raises basic and important social,
economic, or political issues. Id. at 198-99.
The 1949 Editorializing Report, supra note 2, following Sam Morris, did not discuss
advertising. The issue lay dormant until 1963, when the FCC noted that in determin-
ing whether particular programs or viewpoints are subject to the fainess doctrine, it is
immaterial whether they are paid announcements. Stations' Responsibilities Under the
Fairness Doctrine as to Controversial Issue Programming, 40 F.C.C. 571, 572 (1963).
Nothing came of this notice, however, until the FCC first ruled directly on advertising
and the fairness doctrine in 1967. See text at notes 10-13 infra.
8
 WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 381, upon reconsideration, 9 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967), aff'd sub
nom. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
425
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in which the FCC applied the fairness doctrine to commercial advertising, the
Commission held that cigarette advertising was subject to the Liirness doctrine
because it raised the controversial and publicly important issue whether smok-
ing is desirable." Although the Commission referred to cigarette advertising
as "unique" and sought to limit the application of the fairness doctrine to
cigarette advertisements," the courts soon extended the doctrine to other
product advertisements."
During the next several years, the debate over the proper interplay be-
tween the fairness doctrine and advertising focused on delineating the con-
tours of the Banzhaf approach." Out of this debate grew the realization that
it was difficult, and perhaps impossible, to decide on a case-by-case basis
which advertisements should be subject. to fairness obligations.'' Neither the
courts nor the Commission clearly articulated a standard for applying Banzhaf
to product advertisements." Faced with this confusion, the FCC investigated
methods for more adequately implementing the fairness doctrine in the com-
mercial advertising context and released its conclusions in its 1974 Fairness
Report." The Fairness Report divides advertisements into three categories:
9 WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 381, 381-82 (1967). The complainant in Banzhaf argued
that, after broadcasting a number of cigarette commercials, a television station's refusal
to allow a responsible opposing presentation on the advisability of smoking was a fair-
ness doctrine violation. Id. at 381.
1 " WCBS-TV, 9 F.C.C.2d 921, 943 (1967). The FCC stated that its "ruling applies
only to cigarette advertising, and imposes no Fairness Doctrine obligation ... with
respect to other product advertising." Id. The FCC did not apply the fairness doctrine
to any standard product commercials after Banzhaf.
" The first. indication that the FCC's attempt to limit Banzhaf to cigarette adver-
tisements would fail came in Retail Store Employees Local 880 v. FCC, 436 F.2d 248
(D.C. Cir. 1970). In that case, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit held that a department store's regular product advertising during a union boycott
of the store inherently raised one side of a controversial and important issue—the
boycott—and that t he FCC had to consider a fairness complaint that a station's discon-
tinuance of the union's boycott support advertising while continuing to broadcast the
store's regular product advertising violated the station's fairness obligations. Id. at.
258-59.
Shortly thereafter, the same court held that television advertisements for large
cars and leaded gasolines raised the controversial and publicly important issue of the
desirability of motorist preferences which could increase automobile-related air pollu-
tion and its attendant health hazards. Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164,
1169 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Other parties argued that Banzhaf applied to everything from
military recruitment commercials, Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1971), to oil
company commercials concerning the development of oil in Alaska, National Broad-
casting, 30 F.C.C.2d 643 (1971).
12 See Simmons, Commercial Advertising and the Fairness Doctrine: The New F.C.C. Policy
in Perspective, 75 Co Lu m. L. REV. 1083, 1090-1100 (1975).
13 See National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 567 F.2c1 1095, 1101-02
(D.C. Cir. 1977).
14 Id. at 1102.
15 Fairness Report, supra note 3. The FCC's response to the requests for reconsidera-
tion are found in Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration of the Fairness Report,
58 F.C.C.2d 691 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Reconsideration Order].
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editorial advertisements, advertisements making product efficacy claims about
which there is a dispute, and standard product commercials."
Editorial advertisements consist of "direct and substantial commentary on
important public issues." 17 A typical example is an "overt" editorial, pre-
pared and paid for by an organization or an individual, which takes a position
on one side of an important public issue." The advertisement need not
explicitly take a position; any advertisement that "presents a meaningful
statement which obviously addresses, and advocates a point of view on, a con-
troversial issue of public importance" constitutes an editorial advertisement."
The Fairness Report indicates that the FCC will continue to apply the fairness
doctrine to editorial advertisements."
The second category of advertisements in the Fairness Report encompasses
advertisements making product efficacy claims about which there is a
dispute.' These include deceptive, false, and misleading advertisements.'
Because the FCC believes that the Federal Trade Commission can better
sanction false advertising, 23 it decided not to apply the fairness doctrine to
advertisements making product efficacy claims. 24
The third category of advertisements, standard product commercials, in-
cludes advertisements that simply promote the sale of' a product." Although
under the Banzhaf approach these advertisements were potentially subject to
the fairness doctrine, the FCC announced in the Fairness Report its decision to
remove standard product commercials from the doctrine's coverage." The
FCC based this decision on its conclusion that these commercials "make no
meaningful contribution toward informing the public on any side of' any is-
sue." 27 The Commission noted, however, that some product commercials
might discuss public issues in an obvious and meaningful way and would
therefore be subject to the fairness doctrine as editorial advertisements."
The Fairness Report brought both constitutional and statutory objections
from the public. The National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting (NCCB),
Friends of the Earth, and the Council of Economic Priorities sought judicial
review of the FCC's decision not to apply the fairness doctrine to ordinary
product advertisements." These petitioners argued that the public's first
16
 Fairness Report, supra note 3, at 22. The Fairness Report generally classifies adver-
tisements as "paid announcements." Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 22-23.
19 Id. at 23.
29 Id. at 22.
21 Id. at 26-28.
22 Id. at 27.
22 Id. at 27-28.
24 Id.
26 Id. at 24-26,
26 Id. at 26.
27 Id. at 24.
28 Id. at 26.
29 National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095, 1098
(D.C. Cir. 1977).
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amendment right to receive commercial information gives rise to a duty on
the broadcaster to broadcast counter-advertisements." The petitigners
further contended that the FCC's decision was contrary to the public interest
standard imposed on broadcasters by the Communications Act,'" and was ar-
bitrary, capricious, and an abuse of the Commission's discretion." 2
These petitions and other petitions objecting to various parts of the FCC's
decision " 3 were consolidated for review by the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit in National Citizens Committee for Broadcast- .
ing v. FCC."4 After considering petitioners' objections and the FCC's justi-
fications for its Fairness Report, the circuit court HELD: neither the first.
amendment nor the Communications Act requires application of the fairness
doctrine to ordinary product commercials which do not obviously and mean-
ingfully address a controversial issue of public importance." The court up-
held the FCC's decision not to apply the fairness doctrine to ordinary product
commercials as both proper and supported by substantial evidence. 36
National Citizens is significant because it denies any constitutional or
statutory basis for requiring application of the fairness doctrine to product.
advertisements. By refusing to base a public right of access to the broadcast
media for counter-advertising on the recent extension of first amendment
protection to commercial speech, 37 the court has diminished the hope for a
constitutionally-based public right of access on any issue. Additionally, by find-
ing that the Communications Act's public interest standard only broadly
or Id. at 1105.
31 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976).
32 567 F.2d at 1106.
33 Petitioner Committee for Open Media (COM) challenged the FCC's failure to
adopt COM's proposal for a public right of access to the broadcast media as an alter-
native to the fairness doctrine. Id. at 1098. COM advocated that licensees allot a
specified amount of time for the broadcast of messages by members of the public. Id.
at 1112. Also, intervenor Henry Geller challenged the Commission's failure to adopt
his proposal concerning how the FCC should enforce the fairness doctrine's require-
ment that broadcasters devote a reasonable amount of time to coverage of important
public issues. Id. at 1098. Mr. Geller suggested that to ensure compliance with this
requirement, the FCC should require licensees to submit annually a list of what they
considered the ten most controversial issues of public importance during the year, and
a report on the representative programming that was aired on both sides of each issue,
Id. at 1115. Geller also advocated that the FCC abandon its case-by-case review of
fairness doctrine complaints and return to its pre-1962 practice of ascertaining only at
license renewal time whether the licensees complied with the fairness doctrine. Id. The
court's disposition of the COM and Geller proposals is explained at note 36 infra.
34 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
35 Id. at 1105-08.
3" Id. at 1108. Although upholding the Fairness Report, the court. further ordered
the Commission to reconsider the COM access proposal and the Geller "10 issue"
proposal. Id. at 1116. The court rejected, however, Geller's second proposal—that the
FCC investigate allegations of fairness doctrine violations only when the licensee comes
up for renewal—on the grounds that the Commission adequately justified its rejection
of the proposal. Id. As to the court's reasons for its remand, see note 66 infra.
37 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 761-62 (1976).
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guides the FCC, the court has granted the Commission wide discretion to
administer the fairness doctrine and balance the many competing interests in
broadcasting. In the future, unless obvious or compelling circumstances de-
mand implementation of a different policy, the court will accept. the agency's
determination of how best to serve the public interest through the fairness
doctrine.
This casenote will first examine the reasoning employed by the National
Citizens court. It will then analyze the court's rejection of petitioners' argu-
ments that. the first amendment and the Communications Act require applica-
tion of the fairness doctrine to standard product. advertisements. It. will be
suggested that two factors made inevitable the court's holding that. application
of the fairness doctrine to product advertisements is neither constitutionally
nor statutorily required. The first factor is the historical basis of the fairness
doctrine; it is an administrative compromise, not a constitutionally required
balance between broadcasters' and listeners' rights. The second factor is the
courts' traditional deference to administrative agencies, including the FCC.
1.	 NATioNA/. CITIZENS DECISION
In National Citizens, the court considered separately the constitutional and
statutory issues presented. Turning initially to the constitutional issues, the
court rejected two arguments advanced by petitioners asserting that there is a
constitutional basis for requiring the FCC to apply the fairness doctrine to
standard product advertisements:' { " First., the court dismissed the contention
that statements which oppose views presented in commercial advertisements
must be broadcast under the fairness doctrine simply because such statements
are a form of commercial speech protected by the first amendment." Sec-
ond, the court rejected the argument that the public has a significant, con-
stitutionally protected interest in the free flow of information provided by
these counter-commercials.'"
In rejecting petitioners' constitutional arguments, the court stressed that
no individual or group has a right to broadcast a particular point. of view
simply because that point of view is protected speech under the first. amend-
ment.'" The court further determined that the fairness doctrine and the first
amendment are not coextensive:12 because the FCC's standard for determin-
ing whether particular programming is subject to the Fairness doctrine—
whether the programming advocates one side of a controversial issue of pub-
lic importance—is different from the courts' standard for determining
whether certain speech is protected by the first amendment—whether the
speech disseminates information important to the functioning of a Free enter-
prise system.`''` The court stated that product advertisements do not. necessar-
" 567 F.2c1 at 1105.
""
42 Id.
43 Id. at 1105-06.
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ily meet the more rigorous standard for determining whether to apply the
fairness doctrine even though they do meet the standard for determining
whether they are constitutionally protected speech. 44 Thus, the court indi-
cated that it is irrelevant to the fairness doctrine inquiry that such speech is
protected under the first amendment.'" The court effectively denied a
constitutionally-based public right of access to the broadcast media by finding
that the first amendment protection given to commercial speech, and, thus,
counter-advertisements, neither gives the public a right to broadcast such
speech nor compels applying the fairness doctrine to such speech.
Turning to petitioners' statutory challenges to the Fairness Report, the
court first rejected petitioners' argument that the 1959 amendments to the
Communications Act 4" codified the FCC's policy of applying the fairness doc-
trine to product advertisements.'" The court noted that there is no conclu-
sive evidence that counter-advertising was part of the FCC's Fairness doctrine
policy prior to 1959." Even assuming that counter-advertising was part of
pre-1959 policy, the court held that the 1959 amendments did not incorpo-
rate that policy into the Act. 4" ;The court based its conclusion on an earlier
case in which the Supreme Court. found that "[w]hen the Congress ratified
the ... fairness doctrine in 1959 it did not, of course, approve every past
decision or pronouncement by the [FCC] on the subject...."'" Thus, the
court in National Citizens concluded that a policy of applying the fairness doc-
trine to product advertisements was not incorporated in the Communications
Act . . 5I
The court next considered petitioners' second statutory argument—that
the public interest standard of the Communications Act requires the FCC to
allow counter-advertising." The court noted that the fairness doctrine stems
from the Conimunications Act's requirement that broadcasters operate in the
"public interest."'" The court stressed, however, that operating in the public
interest does not necessarily entail application of the fairness doctrine to
product advertisements." Instead, the FCC has discretion to decide what the
public interest demands of broadcasting," and courts accord great deference




 Pub. L. No. 86-274, § 1, 73 Stat. 557 (1959) (cOdified at 47 U.S.C. § 315
(1976)).
47
 567 F.2d at 1107.
" Id.
" Id. at 1107-08.
5° Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 385 (1969).
51 567 F.2cl at 1107-08.
52 Id. at 1106, 1108.
55 Id. at 1107 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976)).
54 567 F.2c1 at 1108.
55 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 385 (1969); Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 109-11 (1973). The public
interest standard includes the obligation to discuss both sides of controversial issues.
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 385.
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to the FCC's judgment of what the public interest. entails." Accordingly, the
National Citizens court found that the public interest is served as long as the
FCC enforces the fairness doctrine's requirement that broadcasters "present
opposing points of view whenever there is direct, obvious or explicit advocacy
of one side of a controversial issue of public importance." sv When, as in prod-
uct advertisements, indirect advocacy of one side of an issue is broadcast,
opposing views need not be presented." Thus, the court concluded that the
FCC's decision not to apply the fairness doctrine to standard product adver-
tisements is within the Commission's discretion and consistent with the public
interest standard in the Communications Act."
Finally, the court examined petitioners' argument that. the FCC acted ar-
bitrarily and abused its discretion in withdrawing standard product commer-
cials from the ambit of the fairness doctrine."" Petitioners acknowledged that
the fairness doctrine applies only to advertisements presenting meaningful
discussion on controversial issues of public importance."' They argued, how-
ever, that standard product advertisements implicitly discuss the controversial
issue of product desirability and, therefore, that. the FCC acted arbitrarily in
concluding that product desirability is not an important, controversial issue
within the meaning of the fairness doctrine. 12 The court rejected petitioners'
contention, pointing to the logic of the FCC's reasoning as evidence that it did
not act arbitrarily." As the court noted, the FCC found that product desira-
bility itself is not a controversial issue of public importance, but rather, the
important, controversial issues are those underlying the issue of product de-
sirability." Standard product advertisements, with their emphasis on product
desirability, do not meaningfully address these underlying issues.''`' On the
basis of this reasoning, the court, held that the FCC was warranted in conclud-
ing that standard product commercials are not subject to the fairness doc-
trine."
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102
(1973).
" 567 F.2d at 1108.
58 Id.
59 Id.
6° Id. at 1108-10.
61
 Id. at 1099.




66 Id. at 1108-10. Although the court upheld the FCC's decision to exclude product.
advertisements from the scope of the fairness doctrine, the court further determined
that the FCC's decision obligated it to consider carefully serious suggestions that had
been made to ensure sufficient and balanced coverage of important public issues. Id. at
1110. Accordingly, the court ordered the FCC to give further consideration to the
COM access proposal and the Geller "10 issue" proposal. Id. at 1116. These proposals
are described at note 33 supra. The court based its order on an assumption that these
proposals might overcome some of the difficulties inherent in enforcement of the fair-
ness doctrine. 567 F.2d at 1111.
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II. ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES
As noted earlier, National Citizens is significant because it denies any con-
stitutional basis for the fairness doctrine. It is submitted that this conclusion is
inevitable because of the courts' long held view of the fairness doctrine as an
adrinnistrative, rather than a constitutional, compromise between the public's
right to receive information and the broadcasters' right to exercise Free
speech. An examination of the Supreme Court cases addressing the relation-
ship between the fairness doctrine and the first amendment. illustrates this
view.
Courts have long recognized that the primary purpose of the first
amendment is to foster a well-informed citizenry"' by prohibiting governmen-
tal restraints upon speech and by permitting every speaker to express his
ideas, so that the public may adopt those that are valuable and correct."' As
applied to the broadcast industry, however, this goal must be modified since
the scarcity of broadcasting frequencies" limits the number of speakers who
can "speak" through the broadcast. medium and, therefore, requires an alloca-
tion of broadcast time between competing voices.'" Thus, although the Su-
preme Court. recognizes that both the public's right and the broadcasters'
rights arc protected to some extent by the first amendment., it refuses to ac-
cord either right full constitutional protection to the exclusion of the other.
Broadcasters once claimed that the first amendment grants them, as
members of the press, absolute autonomy over what is broadcast and when.
They argued that the fairness doctrine's intrusion on their autonomy was a
violation of their first amendment rights since it forced them to broadcast
particular points of view!' The Supreme Court rejected this claim, however,
"7
 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969).
"" Id. at 390: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. I, 20 (1945).
"9
 Although broadcast frequencies arc available to the public, the federal govern-
ment, through the FCC, allocates broadcast licenses to promote the most efficient use
of available frequencies. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 387-89
(1969). If the FCC did not allocate frequencies, confusion would result from multiple
transmissions over the same frequencies. Id. at 388.
7" Columbia ,Broadcasting Sys., inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
101-02 (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 387-91 (1969). While
the FCC argues that the problem of scarcity is acute and will continue for the near
future, Fairness Report, supra. note 3, at 6, it has been suggested that the great capacity
of cable television, when it becomes fully operative, may render obsolete the scarcity
rationale. Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 75-76 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (HazeIon, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973). It has been argued,
therefore, that scarcity is an invalid basis for a constitutional distinction between the
broadcast and print media. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 144-45 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring); Bazelon, FCC Regulation
of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213, 223-29; Bollinger, Freedom of the
Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH.
L. REV. 1, 16 (1976); Schenkkan, Power in the Marketplace of Ideas: The Fairness Doctrine
and the First Amendment, 52 TEX. L. REV. 727, 744-48 (1974). But see Midwest Video
Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978) (the FCC exceeded its jurisdiction by
imposing mandatory access and channel capacity requirements upon certain cable tele-
vision systems), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3187 (Oct.. 3, 1978).
" Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969).
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in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. 72 In that case, the Court held that the
first amendment does not prevent the government from requiring a broadcast
licensee to share its frequency with others under the terms of the fairness
doctrine." In reaching this conclusion, the Court stressed the public nature
of the airwaves and pointed out that the public has a right to suitable access to
ideas and information from the broadcast media. 74
 The Court found that
the fairness doctrine, rather than impermissibly infringing the first amend-
ment rights of broadcasters, adequately balances the broadcasters' rights with
the public's right of access to information." Thus, the Red Lion Court did
not find the fairness doctrine to be a constitutionally required remedy for
balancing the competing interests in broadcasting. Rather, the Court upheld
the doctrine as an administrative compromise of the broadcasters' and the
public's interests which does not unconstitutionally infringe the broadcasters'
first amendment rights."
The Supreme Court affirmed the adequacy of the fairness doctrine's bal-
ance of competing constitutional interests in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
v. Democratic National Committee (CBS). 77 In CBS, the Court determined that
the public's "right to be informed" by the broadcast media, albeit protected by
the first amendment,'" does not require broadcasters to accept editorial adver-
tisements from whoever wishes to pay for them." In reaching this con-
clusion, the Court. noted that the FCC promulgated the fairness doctrine to
ensure that broadcast licensees provide balanced presentations of important
public issues'" To read the first amendment as granting individuals the un-
fettered right to have editorial advertisements broadcast as long as they are
paid for, the Court noted, would upset the delicate balance the FCC has
fOund for serving the interests of both broadcasters and the public." The
Court decided that the FCC must retain the flexibility to balance these in-
terests, and refused to create its own balance based on first amendment
values.'
Red Lion and CBS demonstrate the Supreme Court's recognition of the
inherent conflict between listeners' and broadcasters' first amendment
72 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
73 Id. at 389.
74 Id. at 390. In Red Lion, a broadcaster claimed that the fairness doctrine's re-
quirement that he broadcast particular views, i.e., responses to personal attack, violated
his first amendment freedom of speech and press. Id. at 386. To justify the fairness
doctrine's.limited infringement on the broadcaster's rights, the Court cited the lis-
tener's right to receive information as an important countervailing interest. Id. at 390.
The mere existence of the listener's right served the Court's purpose and it was un-
necessary to explore the scope of that right.
75 Id. at 390-96.
" Id.
77 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
78
 Id. at 102.
79 Id. at .130-31.
8 ° Id. at 111-13.
81 Id. at 120.
82 Id. at 120-21.
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rights.'" However, the Court has concluded that the fairness doctrine
adequately balances these competing interests and, therefore, has found it.
unnecessary to develop a constitutionally-based balance. Because the Court
refused to find that the public has a constitutional right to 'media access, per-
sons could obtain access after Red Lion and CBS only if they could argue
successfully that the issue which they wanted to address was subject to the
fairness doctrine.
When the Supreme Court recently extended first amendment protection
to commercial speech," counter-advertising proponents believed their argu-
ment that the public has a constitutional right to broadcast media access was
renewed. Commercial speech traditionally was not included under the um-
brella of first amendment protection." However, in Virginia Stale Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.," the Supreme Court held
that speech does not. lose its first amendment protection merely because it is
in the Form of a paid commercial announcement," or because the advertiser's
interest is purely economic," and that no lines can be drawn between publicly
"interesting" and "important." commercial speech and "the opposite kind.""
13"
 The Court has stated that "it is idle to posit an unabridgable First Amendment
right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or pub-
lish" because the unique nature of the broadcast media limits the number of frequen-
cies available for broadcasting. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 388.
Because of this limitation, speakers' and listeners' rights conflict, and an ordering of
their respective first amendment values is required. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.
v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 101.
" See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976); see text at notes 85-90 infra.
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52. 54 (1942). It was stated later:
Promoting the sale of a product is not ordinarily associated with any of the
interests the First Amendment seeks to protect. As a rule, promoting
product sales does not affect the political process, does not contribute to
the exchange of ideas, does not provide information on matters of public
importance, and is not, except perhaps for the ad-men, a form of indi-
vidual self-expression. It is rather a form of merchandising subject to limi-
tation for public purposes like other business practices.
Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1101-02 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
"" 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
131
 Id. at 761.
138 Id. at 762.
"" Id. at 765. The Court pointed out that "Ia]dvertising, however tasteless and ex-
cessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is
producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price," and should
he protected to ensure the free flow of information. Id.
At issue in Virginia State Board was a Virginia statute which prohibited licensed
pharmacists from advertising the prices of prescription drugs. Id. at 749-50. A con-
sumer group challenged the statute's constitutionality under the first amendment. Id.
Justice Blackmun, speaking for the majority, concluded that any first amendment pro-
tection enjoyed by advertisers may be asserted by the public as recipients of informa-
tion, id. at 756-57; that. commercial speech is not wholly outside first amendment pro-
tection, id. at 761; and, therefore, that the ban on drug price advertisements is invalid,
id. at 770.
For a brief survey of the history of the breakdown of the commercial speech ex-
ception to first amendment free speech protection, see Note, The Fairness Doctrine and
Access to Reply to Product Commercials, 51 INn, L.J. 756, 769-73 (1976).
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Virginia State Board also held that there is a reciprocal right to receive advertis-
ing_."o
Petitioners in National Citizens used Virginia State Board to argue that since
product advertisements are protected by the first amendment, opposing in-
formation is also protected by the first amendment."' Therefore, the
petitioners argued, the first amendment demands that such opposing infor-
mation he provided via application of the fairness doctrine to standard prod-
uct advertisements." As the court in National Citizens recognized, acceptance
of this argument would mean that the fairness doctrine is coextensive with the
first amendment." Acceptance of this argument also would mean that the
fairness doctrine is a constitutionally-based remedy for the conflict between
the first amendment rights of broadcasters and listeners. The court in Na-
tional Citizens rejected petitioners' contention on the basis of the Supreme
Court's previous refusal to establish a constitutional basis for the fairness doc-
trine."'
It is submitted that petitioners' argument in National Citizens was nothing
more than an assertion that the relatively recent identification of the listener's
right to receive information, and the recent extension of first amendment
protection to commercial speech, tip the compromise balance in favor of the
listener on the product advertisement issue." The circuit court declined to
go that far and, instead, followed the Supreme Court in deferring to the
FCC's opinion of the proper balance." Thus, National Citizens strongly rein-
forces the courts' characterization of the fairness doctrine as an administrative
compromise which determines who has access to the broadcast medium, and
forecloses arguments that the public has a constitutionally-based right of ac-
cess to the medium for counter-advertising or any other type of speech. Con-
sequently, individuals seeking access after National Citizens have only two
hopes for obtaining it. First, they can argue that current fairness doctrine
requirements demand the broadcast of their point of view. Second, they can
seek changes in the fairness doctrine through lobbying directed at either
Congress or the FCC with a view toward obtaining greater media access for
90 Virginia Stale Board, 425 U.S. at 757.
"' 567 F.2d at 1105.
92 Id. One difficulty which petitioners' argument faced was that the nature and
extent of the rights involved are simply not well-defined. The Virginia Stale Board hold-
ing, which was crucial to petitioners' argument, concerned printed advertising. The
Court expressly noted that "the special problems of the electronic broadcast media are
„ . not in this case." 425 U.S. at 773. Thus, petitioners were asking the court to extend
Virginia Stale Board to the broadcast media. Another difficulty which petitioners faced
was that the listeners' right to receive information was not defined clearly. CBS, 412
U.S. at 101-03; Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390. Moreover, the Supreme Court views the
electronic broadcast media as "unique," CBS, 412 U.S. at 101, which apparently means
that first amendment issues may be twisted to solve the media's "unique" problems.
With so much flexibility in the issues, it is not surprising that petitioners' argument in
National Citizens failed.
93 567 F.2d at 1105.
94 Id. at 1105-06.
95
 See note 92 supra.
"" 567 F.2d at 1106.
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the public. The latter method is more promising since it has greater. potential
to increase access." 7 Thus, the importance of National Citizens is that the de-
bate over access now will occur in legislative or administrative bodies, not in
the courts.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE STATUTORY ISSUES
The court's resolution of the statutory issues in National Citizens is impor-
tant for what it says about the FCC's discretion in administering the fairness
doctrine. In effect, the court stated that the determination of who should
have access to the broadcast. media is an administrative, not a judicial, deci-
sion." This was evident in the court's rejection of petitioners' arguments that
applying the fairness doctrine to product advertisements was required by the
Communications Act. The court accepted the FCC decision to the contrary in
the absence of explicit statutory language supporting the petitioners' argu-
ments. 99
Although the court granted the FCC wide discretion to administer the
fairness doctrine, judicial review does play an important role after National
Citizens in ensuring that the FCC follows proper decisionmaking stan-
dards)" By concentrating on the FCC's decisional criteria rather than on its
actual decision, National Citizens is a good illustration of how the District of
Columbia Circuit will approach challenges to the FCC's administrative deci-
sions. This approach is exemplified by the court's rejection of the argument
that the FCC acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and abused its discretion in
finding that standard product advertisements do not present meaningful dis-
cussion on controversial issues of public importance)" The Commission ar-
gued that counter-commercials present only one side of a controversial issue,
since commercials typically only exhort consumers to buy, while counter-
commercials discuss the underlying issues regarding the desirability of buy-
It also contended that applying the fairness doctrine to standard
97
 Behind the access question is the broadcasters' claim that under the first
amendment they, as members of the "press," should not be subject to any regulation
whatsoever. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386. While the uninhibited exercise of free
speech in a regulated industry may be incongruous, one can find support for the
broadcasters' position. See, e.g., CBS, 412 U.S. at 132-46 (Stewart, J., concurring),
146-47 (White, J., concurring), 148-70 (Douglas, J., concurring); Schenkkan, supra note
70 at 765-72.
The access debate foreshadows the larger issue of regulation of program content.
Ultimately, the question that must be answered is "who shall determine what issues are
to be discussed [through the electronic broadcast media], by whom, and when." CBS,
412 U.S. at 130. For suggested answers to this question, see Bollinger, supra note 70;
Schenkkan, supra note 70. An exhaustive compilation of articles on access may be
found in Lange, The Role of the Access Doctrine in the Regulation of the Mass Media: A
Critical Review and Assessment, 52 N.C. L. REV. I, 2 n.5 (1973).
98 567 F.2d at 1108.
99 The National Citizens court was led to this result by its decision that "the [FCC] is
neither constitutionally nor statutorily required" to subject counter-advertisements to
fairness doctrine requirements. Id. at 1116 (emphasis in original).
14' Id. at 1107-16.
'°' Id. at 1108.




product commercials would decrease the attention given by broadcasters to
more important issues covered by the doctrine and, therefore, would not con-
tribute efficiently to informed public opinion." Furthermore, application of
the doctrine to commercial advertising could undermine . the economic base of
commercial broadcasting.'" Thus, the FCC argued, product advertisements
do not meaningfully discuss controversial issues of public importance and, ac-
cordingly, do not come within the scope of the fairness doctrine.'"
While the FCC's arguments are plausible, they are not self-evident and
are subject 10 vigorous counter-argument. 1 " Nevertheless, given the FCC's
discretion to administer the fairness doctrine and the courts' deference to the
Commission's decisions, the plausibility of these arguments was sufficient for
the court in National Citizems to refuse to reverse the FCC decision based on
them."'' The National Citizens court properly concluded that the FCC had
not acted arbitrarily and capriciously, or abused its discretion, in excluding
product advertisements from fairness doctrine coverage. The flexibility and
discretion accorded to the FCC stems in part from the courts' recognition that
application of the fairness doctrine encompasses the problem of conflicting
first amendment tights between broadcaster and listener, and the broader
problem of public access to the broadcast media in general..The complexity of
these problems is one reason the courts have not given the fairness doctrine a
constitutional or statutory foundation. Instead, the courts have allowed the
FCC to resolve these problems. Courts will intervene only to ensure that the
FCC's administrative decisionmaking conforms with the public interest.
The issue remains whether giving the FCC wide discretion in administer-
ing the fairness doctrine produces a satisfactory solution to the problem of
who should have access to the broadcast media and for what reasons. In less
than ten years, the FCC has traveled 360 degrees with respect to subjecting
product advertisements to fairness doctrine requirements. 108
 Nevertheless, it
is submitted that the FCC's policy now rests on a sturdier foundation. The
basic consideration underlying both the Fairness Report and National Citizens is
that standard product commercials and counter-commercials do not present
enough meaningful information to justify the difficulties and cost of broad-
casting them under the auspices of the fairness doctrine. As one commentator
has aptly put it, "[t]he fundamental purpose of the fairness doctrine is to
inform the public on important social issues, and further an open, diverse
103 Id.
"4 Id. at 1110.
"115 Id. at 1109.
" 1 " One also can argue that it is not apparent that commercials cannot contribute
information useful in forming public opinion. See text at note 101 supra. Similarly, one
can argue that addition or deletion of an issue covered by the fairness doctrine will not
necessarily lead to a decrease or increase in the attention given to more important
issues. See text at note 102 supra. While sponsors might he discouraged from broad-
casting advertisements subject to mandatory counter-advertisement, thereby causing
economic loss to broadcasters, no evidence exists as yet to justify this theory. See text
at note 104 supra.
I": Correspondingly, the counter-arguments in note 106 supra are also merely
plausible. Thus, the Commission is free to choose either side.
1U8
 See text at notes 7-27 supra.
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marketplace of ideas.... Telling people to loin the Dodge Rebellion' and
`Step Up' to a larger car is simply not speech on this level." t" Thus, the FCC
and courts such as the court in National Citizens have concluded that product
advertisements are a less important type of speech than political editorials or
institutional advertising. This conclusion represents progress in the correct di-
rection. It eliminates the confusion emanating from past attempts to tie the
fairness doctrine to product advertisements and rationally allocates limited
broadcast time and resources between the various issues that different groups
think ought to be heard.
CONCLUSION
The FCC's 1974 Fairness Report announced the Commission's removal of
standard product advertisements from the purview of the fairness doctrine.
In upholding this policy, the National Citizens court refused to base a public
right of access to the broadcast media on either the public's first amendment
right to receive broadcast information, or the public interest standard of the
Communications Act. The court's decision underscores the FCC's wide discre-
tion in administering the fairness doctrine. As long as the FCC strictly en-
forces the fairness obligation that broadcasters present opposing points of
view whenever there is direct, obvious, or explicit advocacy on one side of a
controversial issue of public importance, the Commission is acting consistently
with its public interest mandate.
The fairness policy upheld in National Citizens illustrates the FCC's con-
tinuing attempt to define the types of speech subject to fairness doctrine re-
quirements and, thus, the kinds of issues that will be addressed in the broad-
cast media. The courts' traditional deference to the FCC's decisions and their
refusal to find a constitutionally-based public right of access to the broadcast
media ensure that the FCC will continue to enjoy great flexibility in address-
ing these problems.
DAVID L. SINAK
"" Simmons, supra note 12, at 113.
